Abstract. E-mail system has become one of the most important and popular Internet services. Instead of using traditional surface mail, we have the alternative of employing e-mail system which provides a reliable and efficient message delivery. However, in the electronic era, privacy, data integrity, and authentication requirements turn out to be especially unavoidable. Secure e-mail system specifications and software developments have been widely discussed in the past decade. Among which OpenPGP is a widespread and well known specification, and PGP becomes a famous implementation. But only limited security analyses on both theoretical and practical aspects about secure e-mail system has been considered previously. In this paper, new chosen ciphertext attacks against the latest version of OpenPGP are proposed with detailed analysis. Furthermore, a new vulnerability due to system version backward compatibility will be pointed out.
Introduction
Electronic communication has played an important role in modern life as Internet has been widely deployed, electronic mail system has especially become one of the most important and popular Internet services. Instead of using traditional surface mail, we have the alternative of employing e-mail system which provides a reliable and efficient message delivery. To provide necessary protection on privacy, data integrity, and authentication on transmitted data, secure e-mail system specifications and software developments have therefore been widely discussed in the past decade. Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) [1, 2] provides most of such necessary cryptographic functions to achieve a secure e-mail application and becomes one of the most famous candidates.
Initiated by Phil Zimmermann in the mid-eighties, PGP has a long history in its evolution from the PGP 1.0 in 1991 until currently the latest version PGP 8.0. The PGP 2.6.x was formally documented in RFC 1991 [3] and is referred as the old PGP message format. The PGP 5.x with the new OpenPGP message format was defined in RFC 2440 [4, 5] . The OpenPGP employs hybrid cryptography in which public key cryptosystem is used for distributing session key and symmetric key cryptosystem (usually called block cipher) will be used for bulk encryption with the distributed session key. To encrypt lengthy message longer than the block size, OpenPGP employs a simple variation of the cipher feed-back (CFB) mode [6] . In this paper, it will be shown that vulnerability due to this modified CFB is possible.
As one of the basic cryptanalytic model, chosen ciphertext attack (CCA) [7, 8] received extensive attention in theoretical aspect. But, CCA was previously considered lack of practical impact as no decryption oracle was found in practical applications. Many recent results revealed that innocent users or servers may fail to tell malicious ciphertext chosen by an adversary from an usual random ciphertext. Thus, the users or the servers are led to act as decryption oracles against themselves. In the scenario of e-mail system security, this idea was first presented by Katz and Schneier [9] , and then such attacks in implementation level were discussed in [10] . Similar attacks also appeared in [11, 12] and also [13] with emphases on RSA PKCS#1 and Secure Socket Layer (SSL), respectively.
However, both theoretical and practical security issues of OpenPGP have not been thoroughly studied yet. In theoretical aspect, the work in [9] merely addressed encrypted-only (abbreviated as EO hereafter) messages, while in practical aspect, the work in [10] considered only old PGP message format.
Our contributions. In [10] , Jallad et al. verified the adaptive-CCA of [9] and showed that EO messages are vulnerable in practice. They also reported that the same attack only succeed with low possibility when compressed-then-signed messages (abbreviated as CT E) are considered. On the contrary, our research results shown in this paper indicates that potential weakness still exists in CT E messages. We show that both EO and CT E messages with either determinate or indeterminate Length fields are vulnerable to adaptive-CCAs.
To the best of our knowledge, all previous related works considered merely the old PGP message format. In this paper, we extend the research to the new OpenPGP message format and propose new attacks. Besides EO and CT E messages, our research results reveal that signed messages are vulnerable to adaptiveCCAs as well. In addition, a new class of attack is pointed out by exploiting system version backward compatibility.
Organization. Specification of the OpenPGP and review of some previous attacks are provided in Sect. 2. Attacks on EO and CT E data with the new message format are discussed in Sect. 3. Sect. 4 considers a new attack by exploiting backward compatibility to old system version. Sect. 5 considers some possible extensions as well as countermeasures. Sect. 6 concludes this paper.
Review of OpenPGP

Modified CFB mode
The OpenPGP employs a simple variation of the CFB mode of block cipher operation and includes a variety of symmetric block ciphers of different block sizes. In this paper, a 64-bit block size is assumed, though all the technical details of attacks considered in this paper applies straightforward to all variants.
Let P be a plaintext to be encrypted and C the corresponding ciphertext using the block cipher E with an encryption key k. Before being encrypted, P is formated as a sequence of n eight-byte blocks, P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P n . Then, a prefix consisting of R 1 and R 2 (eight and two bytes, respectively) is included where R Fig. 1 and is summarized as follows.
Session Key k k k k -Encrypt the fixed 8-byte Initial Vector (IV) with all values of zero, then compute
-Prior to encrypt the first 8-byte plaintext block P 1 , the following CFB resynchronization is performed. A Resynchronization IV (denoted as Resync IV hereafter) is generated by concatenating C 3−8 1
and C 2 . With this Resync IV,
The above modified CFB mode has two properties directly relevant to the work considered in this paper. The first property is the limited error propagation in which errors within C i will only influence P i−2 and P i−1 . Notice that in the conventional CFB mode with stream cipher operation, longer error propagation is expected since the erroneous C i (say a byte) will stay within the 64-bit shift register in the following seven encryption operations.
The second property is that bitwise plaintext flipping is possible by flipping the corresponding bit within the ciphertext block. Flipping the jth bit in C i+2 will lead to the flipping of the jth bit in P i . Notice that the above property is also applicable to the conventional CFB mode, but it is more easy to operate in the modified CFB mode due to the previously mentioned limited error propagation.
OpenPGP message format
An OpenPGP message consists of a number of packets each with a header followed by a chunk of data refereed as body. A header, which contains a one-byte Tag and a varying-length field Length, is a byte string indicating the meaning and the total 1 length of the packet. Two packet encoding formats are available for OpenPGP, i.e., the old format [3] and the new one [4, 5] . In both formats, the first 2 bit of the Tag always sets to binary one, while the second bit serves as an indicator of these two formats.
In the old format, when the second bit (b 6 ) sets to zero, b 5−2 and b 1,0 of the Tag are used to define packet type and Length type, respectively. Since the type of Length is explicitly indicated by Tag, all content of Length can be correctly extracted and it can be encoded as an integer. In the new format, all the bits b 5−0 within Tag are used to define packet type and the Length type is self-explained by the first byte of the Length field. Consequently, two more bits within the header of the new format can be used to indicate more possible packet types.
There are four possible Length types defined for both formats, the first three types with determinate length while the fourth type with indeterminate length. It is worth noticing that the fourth type of the old format does not include a Length field, but it assumes that implementations can determine the payload length. The structure of packet types relevant to this work are summarized in Fig. 2 . More details about formats can be found in Appendix A and [3] [4] [5] . Basic packets combinations. As mentioned previously, an OpenPGP message is the concatenation of some packets. Besides, OpenPGP allows packets to be nested, i.e., in some cases a packet can be the data field of another packet. Note however that not all concatenation and nesting are valid, semantically meaningful and acceptable. The situation is simple in the old format but becomes more complicated in the new format. Basically, in both formats, an EO message can be represented as (PKESKP, SEDP(header, LDP)); and a CT E message as (PKESKP, SEDP(header, CDP(header, LDP))), where PKESKP is the abbreviation of Public-Key Encrypted Session Key Packet.
Previous attacks
PGP was shown to be vulnerable to adaptive-CCAs, which require one chosen ciphertext only, in [9, 10] . The attack model involves three participants. For privacy concern, Alice sends Bob a message under the protection of PGP, i.e., an SEDP along with the session key encrypted by using Bob's public key will be generated and sent. Meanwhile, an adversary Eve may tap the ciphertext and sends an adaptively modified one to Bob. Bod decrypts the fraud message from Eve and will obtain a meaningless byte string. If Bob is not observant enough and replies, for confirmation or asking another copy, with that decrypted string, Bob himself becomes a decryption oracle in favor of Eve's attack. Basically, these attacks take advantage of the properties of the CFB mode mentioned in Sect. 2.1, and they are summarized briefly as follows.
The KS attack against the CFB mode. The attack was first presented by Katz and Schneier in [9] . Suppose Eve with access to a decryption oracle D is trying to recover the block P i of the ciphertext C (both D and C are under the same session key k). First, Eve replaces the block C i with a random block R, and sends this modified ciphertext C = IV, C 1 , . . . , C i−1 , R, C i+1 , . . . , C n to the oracle D. After intercepting the plaintext P = P 1 , . . . , P n (where
Furthermore, she can also recover all blocks by arranging ciphertext blocks and random blocks alternatively.
The JKS Tag-modification attack. In [10] , Jallad et al. analyzed the KS attack against PGP and GnuPG in implementation level. The KS attack works well against EO messages, but fails against CT E cases since the decrypted result may not be decompressable with high probability and the process will be interrupted abnormally. An alternative approach is that the adversary modifies the CDP-header to be an LDP-header. So, Bob will not execute the decompression process but returns the decrypted result directly. Then, an adversary can conduct the previous KS attack and eventually recovers the plaintext by performing decompression by herself. A much simpler case of the JKS attack is that no random block insertion is necessary since the decrypted result (in a compressed form) is basically random blocks. Note especially that this attack works theoretically, but in fact cannot succeed due to [3] [4] [5] . The attack does work against GnuPG, which is a special case implementation.
In this section, we will continue the attacks of [9, 10] Since the attacks against EO messages with determinate Lengths (type-1, 2, 3) in the new format are trivial extensions of the KS attack, discussions start from cryptanalysis against EO messages with the indeterminate Length type.
Attacks against EO messages with indeterminate Length type
In the new OpenPGP message format [4] , the indeterminate Length type (type-4) is extensively revised and some critical modifications are cited as below.
Each partial Body Length header is followed by a portion of the packet body data. The Partial Body Length header specifies this portion's length. Another length header (of one of the three types --one-octet, two-octet, or partial) follows that portion. The last length header in the packet MUST NOT be a Partial Body Length header.
An implementation MAY use Partial Body Lengths for data packets, be they literal, compressed, or encrypted. The first partial length MUST be at least 512 octets long. Partial Body Lengths MUST NOT be used for any other packet types.
However, [4] did not explicitly define how the modified CFB mode works with this Length type. For example, how to find IVs for each portion and how to resynchronize when a portion is not of a multiple of block size. These all make the attack against messages with type-4 Length in SEDP deeply depends on implementation and is difficult to be verified here. Basically, we consider that the attack is feasible due to the fact that headers of SEDPs are always plaintext.
On the other hand, when type-4 Length is only used in the LDP within SEDP, although the aforementioned situations no longer exist, there is no straightforward approach to attack such messages. Unlike the above SEDP case, the LDP header is encrypted. Thus, the JKS attack cannot work unless the attacker is able to predict the length of every portion. Fortunately, by adding the Assumption One, one can successfully recover EO messages with type-4 Length in LDPs as shown in Fig. 3 Note that the step 3 can be simplified: to eliminate the inclusion of random blocks and to set the length of the first portion to 2 w since there are length fields between the true plaintext portions and the decrypted result remains to be random. The possible drawback is that the receiver may detect malicious attack with higher probability when the original first portion is quite long.
Attacks against CT E messages with determinate Length types
For the sake of simplicity, we describe the attack where the CDP is less than 178 bytes and the underlying block cipher is of 8-byte block size.
The main idea of this attack is the same as the JKS attack -forcing the receiver to skip decompression by modifying the packet header. Due to the bitwise plaintext flipping property of the CFB mode and the similarity between headers of different packet types, this modification can be done easier. Unfortunately, the first few bytes in an LDP are used to store the file name for the storage of encrypted data. It makes this attack fail since in most cases no valid file name will be generated after decryption. However, once the outputs of compression algorithms have predictable headers or even fixed prefixes of one byte long, an adversary can modify it to zero and thus no file name appears.
It is important to emphasize that the attack still works because all modified bytes are within the same encryption block. Also note that the Time Stamp recording the time of the file's last modification is reasonably ignored since no file name to be indicated. In order to get the full compressed data (the first two blocks of CDP are missing, the first serves as header while the second is scrambled), an adversary must insert the Resync IV and the full CDP again.
By combining the above skills, one can modify the CT E ciphertext to an EO one (as shown in Fig. 4) . Attack Two. Suppose we are going to recover a CT E message with type-1 Length. One can simply create a chosen ciphertext with the Assumption Two by the following steps.
1. Keep the SEDP header and the first ten bytes unchanged; 2. Modify the CDP header to an LDP header; 3. Since, by assumption, the first byte of CDP body is predictable one can easily modify it to zero and serves as File Name Length of an LDP; 4. Add four bytes of random data, and then add the Resync IV; 5. Append the whole CDP.
Obviously, the attack can be applicable to the second and the third Length types without any modification since the added Resync IV does not only serve as an initial vector for latter blocks, but also as a buffer for Time Stamp. Note that when the CDP is of a length near the limitation of its Length format, say from 179 to 191 in type-1, the attacker either has to discard a portion of message or to recover the whole message by using two chosen messages. Otherwise, the adversary has to predict more leading bytes of the CDP.
Attacks against CT E messages with indeterminate Length type
As for attacks against CT E messages with indeterminate Lengths, one has to produce a chosen ciphertext in a two-step manner. Change CDP to LDP by applying Attack Two first, then use the same idea of Attack One to revise the fraud LDP. Note that the simplified Attack One is absolutely sufficient here since the decryption result is still a compressed data which behaves like a random data.
Vulnerability Due to Backward Compatibility
From the result of the previous section and [9, 10] , both EO and CT E messages are vulnerable against adaptive-CCAs in both new-format-sender/new-formatreceiver (NFS/NFR) and old-format-sender/old-format-receiver (OFS/OFR) scenarios. Furthermore, backward compatibility is always necessary for software development and this happens to OpenPGP as well. When taking backward compatibility into account, it is a natural result that attacks in the OFS/OFR setting can be directly applied to the OFS/NFR setting.
Nevertheless, in this light, there is another choice for adversaries, that is, modifying the new format messages back to the old format ones. As revealed in Table 1 , the readers may find that headers are of various length even for those with the same Length type; particularly, headers in the new format are longer than in the old format. This means that one can obtain predictable bytes from such a modification, thus eliminate the necessity of the Assumption Two. Recall that attacks against EO messages, e.g., the KS attack and the Attack One, can work without the Assumption Two. Hence, discussion merely focuses on CT E messages.
An example attack against type-3 Length field. Since both the first two Length types in the old and the new formats are of the same byte-length, no advantage can be obtained by modifying the new format headers back to the old format ones of the same type. As for headers with type-3 Length field, the old ones are shorter than the new ones by one byte. In addition, the range value of type-3 Length in the new format is not larger than it in the old format.
Precisely, to recover the plaintext of a corresponding ciphertext which contains a CDP with type-3 Length in the new format, an adversary may deceive an old format LDP-header with type-3 length by exploiting the bitwise plaintext flipping property as follows:
1. Modify the CDP-Tag from 0xC8 to 0xAE (10 1011 10 in binary, where the middle 1101 indicates an LDP and the rear 10 indicates the following Length to be of type-3); 2. Change the first four bytes of the five-byte Length to the matching value, and reserve the last byte to the LDP-Type; 3. Set the File Name Length in LDP-body to zero by modifying the CDP-Algo.
Then, the same as in the Attack Two, an adversary has to append random bytes (to fit the block boundary and to serve as Time Stamp as well), Resync IV, and the whole CDP. Finally, the chosen ciphertext is ready to be sent to the decryption oracle.
Backward compatible CCA. As mentioned in Sect. 2.2, in the old message format, the fourth type simply skips the Length field and assumes that the length should be provided by the implementation implicitly. That is, in this case, the header is only one byte and becomes the shortest acceptable header by any PGP implementation. With this observation, the idea of the above example attack can be generalized, and named Backward Compatible CCA (BC-CCA).
When an adversary wishes to recover a message of the new OpenPGP format, no matter which Length type it will be, she can first modify the CDP-header to an old format LDP-header without Length, and then simulates the File Name Length by the third byte (the second byte is for the Type field) of the original packet header. Obviously, since the type-4 Length in the old format is the shortest one in all possibilities and with unlimited range value, this BC-CCA succeeds without the penalty of prediction.
Extensions and Discussions
In this section, the possibility of some potential extension are analyzed. Then, feasibility of the Assumption One and the Assumption Two in practice are discussed. Finally, some countermeasures are suggested.
Extensions to signed or MACed messages
Besides encryption, there are still other cryptographic mechanisms included in the OpenPGP specification. In both the old and the new formats, there is an option of signature although realized with totally different packets composition. MAC (Message Authentication Code) appears in both formats as well. In the old format, it is not explicitly defined but depends on implementations; while in the new format, there is even another packet type for this option.
Signed messages. In the old message format, the signing procedure is quite intuitive -sign the hash value then append the signature after the message as (SEDP(header, LDP, SIGP)); or as (SEDP(header, CDP(header, LDP, SIGP))), when compression is employed.
Clearly, when encryption is employed only, the KS attack can be directly implied since there is no way for the receiver to recognize the existence of a signature packet. Furthermore, since the length of SIGP is fixed, one can even directly remove it prior to attack to reduce the length of the chosen message. Likewise, for CT E messages, since the receiver will decrypt the chosen ciphertext to a random byte-string, he cannot recognize it as a signed message. Hence one can simply apply the Attack Two or BC-CCA to recover a plaintext. The only thing an adversary has to do is to modify Lengths properly.
As for the new format, according to [4, 5] , signed messages can be in two possible packets combinations. However, in either cases, signatures are not included in SEDPs but appended as plaintext, thus an adversary can remove it directly.
MACed messages. Although MAC mechanism is not included in the old PGP message format, some implementations (e.g., GnuPG) force every message to be MACed. In this case, no known attack can recover the corresponding plaintext. Nevertheless, besides backward compatibility between the old and the new format, the inter-operability is also an important functionality of e-mail softwares. Thus, an adversary can modify a message of GunPG to a message of PGP and skips the MAC verification. Briefly, those non-standard protections are still vulnerable due to inter-operability between implementations.
In the latest version of RFC 2440 [5] , a new packet type SEIPDP (Symmetrickey Encrypted and Integrity Protected Data Packet) is defined for MACed messages. In addition, the chaining mode of this packet type is different from the modified CFB described in Sect. 2.1. It makes adversaries unable to succeed any of the known attacks directly. Currently, to the best of our knowledge, how to attack this new packet type is still an open problem.
New attacks in practice -experimental result
In Sect. 3, two new adaptive-CCAs are introduced with two assumptions respectively. Experiments have been done for a receiver with PGP 8.0 and sender with both PGP 8.0 and PGP 2.6., and the results show that those two assumptions are both true in practice.
1. When a plaintext message is quite short, say, several vocabularies, the first 3 byte tends to be 0x3B with high probability. 2. For longer messages, the first byte tends to be 0xEC. 3. In the new format messages, when the type-4 Length is employed, the first portion tends to be 2 10 bytes in length.
Possible countermeasures
In [9, 10] , many countermeasures are proposed. As relevant attacks are all originated form properties of the CFB mode, using modes which are secure against
A The New OpenPGP Message Format
In this format, only packet type is defined by b 5−0 and thus each packet type has a unique Tag. Tags relevant to this research include 0xC2(SIGP), 0xC8(CDP), 0xC9(SEDP), and 0xCB(LDP). There are totally four possible Length types selfexplained by the first byte of the Length field:
-One-byte Length. When the first byte is valued in the range from 0 to 191, one-byte length field is used, which obviously means the Length of the resident packet is ranged from 0 to 191 bytes. 
